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The Kremlin’s military annexation of Crimea and involvement in eastern 
Ukraine have alarmed members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), including the United States, and have in part prompted a return 
to a model of Great Power Competition. Russia’s demonstrated ability 
and willingness to use subversive instruments such as cyber attacks, 
clandestine operations, coercive political and economic influence, proxies 
and information operations to pursue its national interests has the 
potential to be fundamentally destabilizing for Europe. Moscow seeks to 
use hybrid warfare strategy to advance a number of specific policy 
objectives including dividing and weakening NATO, annexing territory, 
undermining pro-Western governments, and reasserting power in its 
territorial periphery. The persistent threat of nuclear weapons 
complicates and limits Western responses to Russian gray zone activities, 
and forces the West to pursue new options to deter Russia and assure 
NATO Allies.
Maintaining Presence: How does SOF 
Contribute to the Deterrence and 
Assurance Mission in Europe?
Deterrence & Assurance
US extended deterrence commitments are credible 
and continue to be a powerful strategic instrument 
in denying an adversary’s attack on the United States 
and its allies. With the return of great power 
competition with states such as Russia, the United 
States will continue to tailor its deterrence strategy 
to protect vital interests. It order to bolster 
credibility through extended deterrence, the United 
States will need to continue to incorporate and 
support allies in a more diversified set of deterrent 
activities.  Many of these activities fall below the 
threshold of conventional conflict and include 
efforts to support and prepare local populations to 
counter Russian aggression and information 
operations, and promote allied defenses.  SOF is 
uniquely qualified to carry out such missions.
Findings:
By implementing SOF core tasks, special operations forces 
can be used to augment the traditional deterrence and 
assurance mission in Europe. For example, through 
activities that build partner capacity, like FID and OPE, US 
and allied SOF can train, support and equip local 
indigenous forces to counter adversary gray zone 
aggression.  In confronting Russia, the strength of US 
alliances is the cornerstone of the US commitment to 
deter aggression.
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Research design
The study argues that Special Operations Forces  
which conduct deniable missions and activities 
that shape conflict and pre-crisis environments, 
offer unique tools to augment US efforts to deter 
Russia and assure NATO Allies. Certain SOF Core 
Tasks, including Direct Action, Unconventional 
Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, Security Force 
Assistance, Civil Affairs Operations, Military 
Information Support Operations, etc., offer options 
that can be used to deter a hostile state and assure 
allies in a gray zone environment.
